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Abstract. This article describes how the psychological rationales for, and the consequences of, the same 
nuclear policies can be constructed very differently by different groups of nuclear policymakers. Some 
possible rationales for these differences are offered. 
 
Should the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) no longer ascribe to a policy of the possible first 
use of nuclear weapons? Advocates of maintaining the status quo assert that a policy of possible first 
use was effective during the Cold War in deterring nuclear and conventional war initiated by the Soviet 
Bloc. They also maintain that in an analogous fashion the policy has been and would be an equally 
effective deterrent against the employment by adversaries of other weapons of mass destruction--e.g., 
chemical and biological warfare agents. Finally, they maintain that a policy of possible first use has been 
an integral part of security strategy since the dawning of the Nuclear Age and should remain so--an 
appeal to tradition. 
 
Opponents of the status quo assert that a policy of possible first use has already resulted in one nuclear 
employment by the United States Government (USG) against Japan near the end of World War II--an 
employment (they maintain) that was not necessary to achieve USG military and political objectives of 
that war. Opponents also maintain that the absence of nuclear and conventional war between NATO 
and the Soviet Bloc had little or nothing to do with a policy of possible first use. They support this 
assertion by noting that the Soviet Bloc had no stated policy of possible first use and positing that this 
lack of possible first use policy was the salient deterrent factor. Or they note that other factors having 
nothing to do with a policy of possible first use were responsible for deterrence. In addition, some 
opponents note that a policy of possible first use must inevitably lower the threshold of actual nuclear 
weapons use during times of international crisis much as handguns are reputed to do in times of 
domestic crisis. Moreover, the very notion of possible first use as a deterrent is dependent on a so-
called logical and rational calculus that may not be shared by real and potential adversaries. Finally, 
some opponents note that the absence of nuclear or conventional war between nuclear adversaries 
during the Cold War belies the many surrogate struggles that did occur--i.e., the Cold War was not so 
cold--or was not due to anything. This last conclusion suggests that the very human propensity to 
attribute meaning might be founded on the most precarious of philosophical premises. 
 
Another nuclear policy controversy involves the push by some high-level military and civilian leaders at 
the Pentagon to unilaterally reduce nuclear arms below the levels mandated by the first Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START 1). This push seems to be founded on the notion that the USG has already 
agreed to reduce nuclear arms to the levels of START 2, and it is not cost-effective to maintain and 
rebuild assets that will be destroyed under this treaty as soon as Russia has ratified it--and so far it has 
been a 5-year wait. 
 
Supporters of this push seem to agree that reductions can occur without harming the alleged deterrent 
capabilities of the USG arsenal. They also assert that unilateral reductions could finally induce the 
Russian Parliament to ratify START 2. 
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Opponents of the push seem to agree that reductions cannot occur without harming the alleged 
deterrent capabilities of the USG arsenal. They also assert that prohibiting reductions increases pressure 
on the Russian Parliament to finally sign START 2. 
 
Both the possible first use policy and unilateral reduction policy are characterized by competing 
psychologies that render antithetical rationales and consequences to the same actual and hypothesized 
events. These psychologies may suggest much more about their advocates than about the policies to 
which they are being applied. First, policy advocates may be too insensitive to the non-rational that has 
been so well-delineated by policy theorists heavily influenced by Harold Lasswell. Second, policy 
advocates may be too quick to claim the import of variants of bounded rationality that are so well-
delineated by management theorists heavily influenced by Herbert Simon. The replacement of policy 
with management may have subverted the deep analysis necessary to construct a nuclear psychology 
supporting life against death. (See Churcher, J., & Lieven, E.V. (1983). Images of nuclear war and the 
public in British civil defense planning documents. Journal of Social Issues, 39, 117-132; Cohen, R. 
(November 24, 1998). Germans irk U.S., urging NATO shift atom policy. The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com; Frank, J. (1983). Nuclear arms and prenuclear leaders: Sociopsychological 
aspects of the nuclear arms race. Political Psychology, 4, 393-408; Kull, S. (1983). Nuclear arms and the 
desire for world destruction. Political Psychology, 4, 563-591; Lasswell, H. (1930). Psychopathology and 
politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Myers, S.L. (November 23, 1998). Pentagon ready to shrink 
arsenal of nuclear bombs. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; Shenon, P. (November 25, 
1998). Germany drops call to NATO on nuclear use. The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com; 
Simon, H. (1960). The new science of management decision. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall; Tyler, 
T.R., & McGraw, K.M. (1983). The threat of nuclear war: Risk interpretation and behavioral response. 
Journal of Social Issues, 39, 25-40; Wessells, M.G. (1995). Social psychological determinants of nuclear 
proliferation: A dual process analysis. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 1, 49-65.) 
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